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This paper discusses whether John Maynard Keynes’ "How to Pay for the 
War" provided prescriptions for the policies of "financial repression" that 
were implemented in England, and other countries, following World War II. 
It focuses on contemporary understandings of inflation which has been 
identified as a key factor for driving down public debt levels. Keynes has been 
widely acknowledged as influential in the management of public debt, and 
"How to Pay for the War" has been cited as proof for a widely held belief in 
"money illusion", suggesting the possibility of using inflation for driving 
down real interest rates of public bonds. It seems reasonable to suppose that 
Keynes’ writings were instrumental in translating English monetary 
experiences of the 1920s and 1930s into expectations of policy makers during 
and after the Second World War, and thus provide an important explanation 
for the why and when of "financial repression". The paper argues that Keynes 
provided only partly ammunition for a policy of "financial repression", and 
none for using inflation as a "tax gatherer" to the detriment of domestic savers 
in general. Crediting him as a source for widespread "money illusion" is also 
out of line with the historical record.  
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In the wake of increasing public debt levels, the literature on "financial repression" has 
seen a comeback. Understood broadly as a combination of artificially set interest ceilings, 
capital controls, and inflation, "financial repression" describes a set of policy tools in favor of 
public finances but detrimental to domestic savers and bondholders (Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 
1995). The timing and economic effects of such measures have been demonstrated in detail 
(Battilossi 2005; Reinhart 2012). Less attention has been paid to explaining the historical 
sources of "financial repression". Thus, there remains a puzzle as to why public officials 
pursued policies of "financial repression" when they did. In the case of England, high public 
debt levels had posed a problem in the wake of the First World War. Yet policies of "financial 
repression" would not be pursued until after the Second World War.  
John Maynard Keynes’ "How to Pay for the War", published in 1940, figures 
prominently in explanations of "financial repression" (Keynes 1940a). Written during the early 
stages of World War II the pamphlet seems to have foreshadowed and legitimized the 
expropriation of savers and bondholders by the state. "Financial repression" greatly helped to 
reduce the burden of debt after the Second World War which had persisted after the first one 
(Crafts 2016). Why was the state successful after the Second World War where it had failed 
before? According to the economic literature, "How to Pay for the War" provided guidance for 
policymakers on two fronts. First, as Reinhart and Sbrancia (2015) have claimed, it illuminated 
the functioning of an "inflation tax" by discussing the relations between state budgets and 
monetary depreciation. Second, as Akerlof and Shiller (2010) have argued, "How to Pay for the 
War" fortified the academic claim for a widespread belief in "money illusion" (Akerlof and 
Shiller 2010). More recently, "How to Pay for the War" has been explicitly proposed as a 
guidance for financial policy in the face of increasing debt levels (Sanz Bas 2019). 
While inflation is not included in all definitions of "financial repression" it has been 
generally considered as instrumental for driving down real interest rates, as the de-valuation of 
money also devalued the nominal debt held by bondholders. To do so, however, the public 
needed to be unaware of the inflationary effects on bond yields. Otherwise, investors would be 
expected to protect themselves against the losses by indexing bonds, or to withdraw from the 
market altogether (Dornbusch and Draghi 1990). The failure to do so is considered by Akerlof 
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and Shiller as proof for the existence of "money illusion", and "How to Pay for the War" is one 
of their central reference points for making this claim.1  
This article tests the historical validity of such claims in light of the historical record, 
and by doing so addresses the question of the prerequisites of "financial repression" in the 1940s 
and 1950s more generally. Taking Keynes' campaign on "How to Pay for the War" and the 
debate surrounding it as a starting point, it investigates contemporary understandings of 
monetary values and its role for controlling public debt levels. Keynes has been widely 
acknowledged as "influential" in the management of public debt (Allen 2019, p. 44), and it 
seems reasonable to suppose that his writings were instrumental in translating English monetary 
experiences of the 1920s and 1930s into expectations of policy makers during and after the 
Second World War. 
The article attempts to position Keynes’ thoughts in the institutional setting of financial 
policy during and after the Second World War (Weir 1989) to see whether this assumption 
holds true. Indeed, the control of real interest rates and the instrumentalization of inflation figure 
prominently in "How to Pay for the War". A closer look will reveal, however, that Keynes 
provided only partly ammunition for a policy of "financial repression", and none for using 
inflation as a "tax gatherer" to the detriment of domestic savers in general. Crediting him as a 
source for widespread "money illusion" is also out of line with the historical record. Finally, 
the evidence suggests that speaking of an "era of financial repression" is misleading. The low 
real interest rates that Keynes argued for were a direct outcome of learning from experience 
about post-war-worlds and the burden of public debt. There is little to no evidence from this 
period that Keynes, the Treasury, or the Bank of England had an interest in using inflation as a 
"mighty tax gatherer" over the long run.  
The paper proceeds as follows: the first part puts "How to Pay for the War" in the long-
term context of English debt management and its interpretation in the economic history 
literature. The second part provides an analysis of Keynes' "How to Pay for the War", 
supplemented with additional publications. It starts with a short description of its contents, then 
focuses on what Keynes thought about inflation awareness in general, and about its role for the 
 
1 “Money illusion” is usually not discussed as a prerequisite for “financial repression” because of its doubtful 
validity as a concept in economics (Chytilova 2017). Yet a widespread unawareness of monetary depreciation 
would have greatly facilitated public borrowing at negative real interest rates, and the sluggishness of inflation 
expectations in practice has been generally accepted (Bassetto and Galli 2019). 
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management of public debt in particular. The third part provides an outlook on Keynes' role for 
public finances and inflation during and after the Second World War. The final part concludes.  
 
From Fiscal Orthodoxy to "Financial Repression". Public Debt and Inflation Awareness 
in English Economic History 
 
The development of English sovereign debt in the first half of the 20th century looks like 
a stairway. It starts from a negligible ratio of debt-to-GDP in the early 20th century and rises 
steeply during the First World War. It stabilizes at a high level during the 1920s and declines 
somewhat in the 1930s before making another upward swing during the Second World War. In 
the second half of the 20th century, the development of English sovereign debt resembles a slide. 
Shortly after the Second World War, the ratio continues to drop: steeply and continuously until 
well into the 1990s. The two wars had the same effect on public finances. Their aftermaths were 
astonishingly different. How did governments and Treasury succeed after World War II in what 





From a superficial perspective, the answer seems easy. In both World Wars long-term 
domestic borrowing was "the most significant factor" (Broadberry and Howlett 2016, p. 204; 
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were high, mostly due to the deflationary policies of the time. This put downward pressure on 
prices and wages, also lowering tax incomes and jeopardizing the ability of the state to reduce 
public debt. In the late 1920s real Consol yields, i.e. yields of a perpetual bond for which the 
government had the option of redemption, were three percent higher than before World War I 
(Foreman-Peck 2002, p. 106). Whereas countries like Germany or France had been able to get 
rid of their internal indebtedness by "cheating" the debt holders through inflation (ibid., p. 115) 
bondholders in England succeeded in receiving high yields despite widespread unemployment 
and antagonisms towards the "rentier" (Howson 1975; Maier 1984). Although there was a 
widely held belief "that owners of government bonds should not profit from WWI and that 
future generations should not have to pay for WWI" (Nason et al. 2007, p. 290), even continuous 
budget surpluses proved unable to reduce the debt significantly. 
After the Second World War, the situation was different. Real interest rates turned 
negative, due to inflation in a context of blocked investment alternatives and interest ceilings. 
Because there seems to have been a conscious government policy of expropriating rentiers – 
the holders of government debt – the term "financial repression" was introduced. Originating 
from debates around financial development strategies in the 1970s, the concept more recently 
has been used to analyze fiscal and monetary policies of industrialized countries in the decades 
following the Second World War, including the case of England (Battilossi 2005; Monnet et al. 
2014; Reinhart and Sbrancia 2015; van Riet 2018; Marinkov 2019). "Financial repression" can 
be defined as involving "directed lending to the government by captive domestic audiences 
(such as pension funds or domestic banks), explicit or implicit caps on interest rates, regulation 
of cross-border capital movements, and (generally) a tighter connection between government 
and banks" (Reinhart 2012, p. 38). As a means for reducing debt-to-GDP ratios "financial 
repression" would usually be accompanied by "an equally steady dosage of inflation" (ibid: 39; 
Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1995). Because such policies were widespread between the 1940s 
and 1970s the whole period has been considered an "era" of "financial repression" (Reinhart 
2012; Reinhart and Sbrancia 2015). 
Recently, Nick Crafts has identified inflation as the driver of debt reduction after the 
Second World War in England (Crafts 2016). Already by the late 1950s the ratio of national 
debt-to-GDP was lower than at the end of the First World War. Against this background, 
Charles Maier´s claim that there was a "general understanding" after World War II to "not 
burden the polity with the social and psychological toll of acute inflation" (Maier 1984, p. 121) 
makes sense in comparison to the German inflation after World War I, but not in light of 
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Britain´s own history when viewed through the lens of "financial repression". Yet Maier´s claim 
is well supported by abundant historical literature on English public finance after the Second 
World War. The management of debt, its institutional and organizational developments, the 
structure and level of indebtedness, the "Treasury view" on state finances, the "origins of cheap 
money" and the role of the Bank of England are all well documented (Sayers 1956; Fforde 
1992; Howson 1993; Wormell 2002; Allen 2012 and 2019). If anything, inflation figures as a 
"threat" in those accounts, but not as a conscious policy choice (Howson 1993, p. 2). How can 
this be explained? 
Few have attempted to explain and understand the differences between the aftermaths 
of the two World Wars in light of "financial repression" and inflationary monetary policies 
intended to reduce the debt burden. Fforde (1992) focuses on Keynes’ role mostly with respect 
to Anglo-American loan negotiations, and does not discuss inflation as a policy prescription or 
"tax gatherer". Allen´s study on the role of the bank of England as a manager of public debt 
provides valuable insights in the decision-making process relevant for putting "financial 
repression" into practice (Allen 2019). But his detailed study does not discuss the role of "How 
to Pay for the War", nor does it raise the issue of public inflation awareness that was crucial for 
investors given the very-long-term durations of British Consols and other government bonds.  
Clearly, something changed between the 1920s and the 1950s in terms of fiscal as well 
as monetary policy. Yet much of economic history treats the development as given focusing on 
the economic effects of public debt levels rather than explaining how they came into existence. 
One can, of course, draw some inference from explanations resting on the period of "financial 
repression" alone. If authorities were willing and able to use inflation and interest ceilings as a 
means to bring down the public debt after the Second World War they must have been either 
unwilling or unable to do so after the First World War. Reinhart and Sbrancia claim that "the 
role played by the combination of some inflation and negative ex-post real interest rates in debt 
reduction was well understood ex-ante" by policy makers. As an example, they use Keynes' 
"How to Pay for the War" as being "filled with discussion of inflation 'as a mighty tax gatherer'" 
(Reinhart and Sbrancia 2015, p. 300). Reinhart and Sbrancia acknowledge that Keynes was 
skeptical towards inflation. They fail to mention, however, that using inflation for taxation was 
not a novel insight at the time and widely discussed by Keynes as well as inside the Treasury 
(Keynes 1919; 1923). Already John Stuart Mill in the 1870s had argued that governments 
always had "a direct interest in lowering the value of the currency, because it is the medium in 
which their own debts are computed." (Mill 1871, p. 558; cf. Laidler 1991: p. 34).  
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By this criterion, the strategy could just as well have been used after the First World 
War. It is clear that somehow, as Reinhart claims, the Great Depression and World War II were 
instrumental in changing government policies away from the idea of laissez-faire (Reinhart 
2012, p. 40). Yet a more detailed historical account of "How to Pay for the War" might be able 
to identify more clearly where such ideas were coming from, and whether inflation itself was 
actually considered as a policy tool by Keynes. Had Keynes’ writings – as implicitly claimed 
by the more recent literature on "financial repression" – the potential of changing the 
preferences and expectations of policy makers in such directions? 
The need for a historical explanation is informed by economic theory. High levels of 
debt pose a risk to credibility, and at a certain level – as Dornbusch and Draghi (1990, p. 6) 
state - creditors "shy away" from bonds and ask for measures like indexing. If that had happened 
after World War II in the UK - and other countries - debt reduction would hardly have been 
effective. Why indexing was seemingly not an option remains puzzling unless the institutional 
constraints are seen as so powerful as to leave investors with no other choice. In "Animal 
Spirits", however, the failure of indexing bonds is seen as an indication of the failure to see 
through the "veil of inflation" (Akerlof and Shiller 2010, p. 50), a failure that had been 
supposedly pronounced and widespread at the height of "financial repression" before the 1960s. 
As evidence, Akerlof and Shiller cite "How to Pay for the War" (ibid). The lack of financial 
literacy implied here could provide an important prerequisite as to why "financial repression" 
was deemed a successful strategy by policymakers and finance officers in favor of expropriating 
domestic savers, in particular the holders of public debt.  
The importance of Keynes in advising the Treasury on a permanently low nominal 
interest rate for public debt during the war has been widely documented and acknowledged 
(Howson 1993; Aspromourgos 2014). His views on using inflation as a policy tool for 
managing public debt have received much less attention. While inflation was clearly a 
consequence of war financing, and crucial for reducing the debt burden, its role for 
contemporary policy choices remains dubious. By the end of the Second World War numerous 
countries across the world had become so highly indebted that public debt was considered a 
"political problem of the first order" (Wallich 1946, p. 293). Many contemporary commentators 
already suspected the return of inflationary forces. In retrospect, some authors (Fry 1989) have 
explicitly linked "financial repression" to the Keynesian revolution, and inflationary expansion 
as a policy tool. More recently, however, Allen has critically stated that "no reader of the 
archives can seriously believe that the Treasury or the Bank of England actually wanted to 
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create unanticipated inflation" (Allen 2014, p. 212). Earlier historical accounts on financial 
policy and contemporary economic thinking have similarly argued that inflation was generally 
not "expected to be a permanent problem" (Howson 1993, p. 44). A closer look at "How to Pay 
for the War" can thus provide important insights into the origins of "financial repression" and 
to what extent Keynes should indeed be seen as instrumental for it. 
 
Keynes' "How to Pay for the War"  
 
In 1939 Keynes was heavily engaged in a political campaign that his biographer Donald 
Moggridge has called "the most sophisticated and successful of his many campaigns as a 
publicist" (Moggridge 1992, p. 629). His aim was to solicit widespread support for a war 
financing scheme as Britain was starting to mobilize for what would ultimately become the 
Second World War. Keynes was realistic about the costs of mobilization as well as its effects. 
He hoped to avoid rigid controls as much as inflation. At the center of his plan was the idea of 
compulsory savings, or deferred payments. Stated simply, Keynes asked labor to forgo parts of 
its income gains in favor of state consumption. It was basically a "forced loan" – money which 
the English state was supposed to pay back once the war was over. Keynes spread his ideas via 
lectures, The Times, The Economic Journal, private and public discussions, radio, and a 
pamphlet entitled "How to Pay for the War", published in 1940. Although small in comparison 
to scholarly debates on his other works, Keynes' plan "How to Pay for the War" has still elicited 
some historical research interest beyond its role for "financial repression" (Trevithick 1975; 
Littleboy 1996; King 1998), most notably for its importance in the development of modern 
macro-economics and national accounting (Kurabayashi 1994; Hicks 1990).  
In devising and propagating his plan, Keynes' primary concern was the question of 
distribution which he called the "thorniest question of all" (Keynes 1940a, p. 2). In contrast to 
normal times, Keynes explained, consumer goods in a war economy would not become more 
plentiful when production and working time were extended because any additional output 
would have to be used for the war effort (ibid, p. 3). Thus, there were fewer consumption 
opportunities available to the public. At the same time the increased demand for labor and 
longer working hours would put more money into the hands of the working people. Less certain 
was how the scarcity produced by the war economy would translate into the price system. If 
nothing was done, Keynes argued, a rise in prices was inevitable because of the disequilibrium 
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between supply and demand. This would lead to much or all of the wage gains being sucked up 
by inflation. The money would then go to the "profiteers", the firms who sold the expensive 
products. It would then go partly to the Treasury in the form of (excess profit) taxes and partly 
remain in the hands of the profiteer who would use it to buy public bonds. Keynes argued that 
this had happened in World War I. Inflation had proved to be "much more cruel in equity terms 
than the most cruel of regressive taxes" (Maital 1972, 159).  
Something needed to be done. Keynes had been preoccupied with the issue of prices 
and inflation from the beginning of the war as "one of the most urgent and important matters 
for the Home Cabinet" (Keynes 1939b, p. 4). Price controls could help in keeping labor from 
making wage demands. Keynes was in favor of this. But from the beginning, he was skeptical 
whether it was sufficient. In September 1939 he called the idea of trying to keep prices at pre-
war levels "fanciful and highly unrealistic" (Keynes 1939c, p. 31). "How to Pay for the War" 
presented a comprehensive plan centering on the idea of "deferred payments". Roughly 
speaking all receivers of income were supposed to forego part of their wage gains in exchange 
for a claim on future resources. The contribution was supposed to move on a progressive scale. 
Lower incomes were exempted. The final publication also included a detailed plan on family 
allowances.  
The deferred payments, which would be placed with a range of institutions like the Post 
Office Savings Bank, friendly societies or trade unions, were to be released in the first post-war 
slump when demand was behind supply (Keynes 1940a, p. 44-50). The technicalities of 
repayment were essentially dictated by the state. The interest rate was set by Keynes at 2,5 per 
cent – the same rate which he envisioned for public bonds. In a letter to the editor of the Times 
Keynes argued that "in principle these loans would be in exactly the same position as the rest 
of the short-dated debt which the war will leave behind it" (Keynes 1939d, p. 82).  
Keynes himself stated that most economists and large parts of the public reacted 
favorably to his plan. Parts of labor was noncommittal or even hostile (Toye 1999) as was the 
National Savings Association who feared a crowding-out effect. While part of the critique 
centered on the problem of voluntarism another part addressed the problem of inflation. When 
Keynes presented his plan to union members, he received skeptical reactions because they 
suggested "that the value of the deferred pay was likely to be eradicated by future inflation" 
(Toye 1999, 17). Barbara Wootton, a lecturer in Economics at Cambridge and Research Officer 
of the Trade Union Congress, praised Keynes' proposal for a capital levy in a lengthy review, 
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arguing that this might "diminish the very real danger that if our deferred pay ever is paid up, 
this will be done by inflation" (Wootton 1940, p. 149). 
Keynes suggested that there should be some sort of indexing but he also admitted that 
given historical experience it would be "'extraordinarily difficult to get an assurance' from the 
Treasury on these lines" (Toye 1999, p. 17). The skepticism proved valid. When the Treasury 
ultimately issued a bond similar to what Keynes had envisioned its value was eradicated by 
post-war inflation (ibid.). It seems ironic, therefore, that given inflation as a running thread 
throughout his work Keynes seemed unwilling to discuss it as a serious element of the plan for 
future repayments. He seemingly had no problem to follow the suggestion of Henry Clay and 
others to drop a section on indexing compulsory savings because "it would divert discussion 
from his main proposal" (Moggridge 1992, p. 629). 
 
How to Pay for the War and the Prerequisites of "Nature´s Remedy" 
 
Early in the war, Keynes had admitted the advantage of a rising price level for public 
finances: "The aspect of higher prices as an instrument of revenue is not to be overlooked. 
Direct taxation can scarcely do all that is wanted" (Keynes 1939b, p. 6). Given inflation to 
always fall back on, financing of the war itself was not of primary interest to Keynes. The goods 
that were ordered by the supply departments would be "financed anyway". The importance of 
devising a coherent plan of war finance was social, "to prevent the social evils of inflation now 
and later" (Moggridge 1992, p. 643). In Keynes' view, however, inflation was less a conscious 
policy but rather the result of laissez-faire. At different points he described it as "nature´s 
remedy", and in a much-quoted passage he explained the problem of assigning responsibility 
for it as the main "advantage": 
"No one has to take the responsibility for inflation, not even the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. The adoption of my plan would require the approval of the Labour Party. 
But they will never be asked to approve inflation. It will just happen. It is nature's 
remedy, ebbing up like the tides, silently and imperceptibly and irresistibly (…) It 
greatly benefits some important interests. It oils the wheels everywhere, and a regime 
of rising wages and profits spreads an illusion of prosperity. So if one is to bet on the 




The term "nature´s remedy" implied a lack of agency on the part of labor. "The 
workingmen", Keynes claimed, had "no (…) choice" (Keynes 1939e, p. 76). Inflation would 
"defeat" him just like in the last war so that the real gains would be diminished without any 
possibility of resistance. Wage demands would simply drive a "vicious spiral" that could 
potentially lead to an "unlimited inflation" (ibid.). The reason why Keynes believed that 
inflation had not run out of control lay in temporality: "Wage adjustments and the like take time 
(…) It is these time-lags and other impediments which come to the rescue" (Keynes 1940a, p. 
66). In the First World War there had been a "time-lag of almost exactly a year" (Keynes 1940a, 
p. 72). It was the time-lag which according to Keynes had prevented "disaster" in England, 
referring to the hyperinflation experiences of countries like Germany and Austria and the more 
violent protests elsewhere.  
Keynes openly criticized union leaders for their futile wage demands: "Like the dog in 
the fable, they lose the substance in gaping at the shadow" (Keynes 1940a, p. 6). It would be 
incorrect to ascribe this to individual folly. Keynes admitted "that the better organized sections 
might benefit at the expense of other consumers" (ibid.). He was sure that "in their minds and 
hearts the leaders of the trade unions" were aware about this futility "as well as anyone else" 
(ibid.). He even thought this "legitimate" as long as no alternative plan was presented. It is thus 
crucial to see Keynes’ views on wage demands in a social context. His proposal was an attempt 
to change the rules of the game. This of course presented a blow to orthodox views of non-
interference. When Keynes discussed his plan with Pethick-Lawrence of the Labour Front 
Bench who vehemently defended voluntary saving, Keynes felt he "was up against such a 
terrific degree of nineteenth-century laissez-faire, that the discussion was more of historical 
than of current interest" (Keynes 1940b, p. 98).  
 
An evolutionary view of "inflation awareness" 
 
Keynes accredited union leaders a ready awareness of the consequences of inflation. It 
is less clear to what extent this held generally. At the time of the publication of "How to Pay 
for the War" Keynes claimed that inflation was "not yet understood by everyone" and that even 
economists had "only got clear about it (…) in the last quarter of a century" (Keynes 1940a, p. 
70). Yet Keynes' understanding of inflation awareness seems itself hardly consistent. In a letter 
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to the Editor of the New Statesmen, not long after having published "How to Pay for the War", 
Keynes claimed that everyone had become "index-number conscious" (Keynes 1940b, p. 120-
121). John Hicks, who debated Keynes' ideas on "How to Pay for the War" publicly and 
privately, had early on expressed his irritation of Keynes' readiness to think that – while highly 
problematic in terms of distributive justice - inflation would at least be able to solve the problem 
of war financing. Hicks could not see how organized labor would be content with a fall in the 
standard of living induced by inflation rates outstripping nominal wage gains: "Surely you will 
agree that that must mainly defeat the aim of the price rise. It seems to me that it will defeat it 
more quickly than in the last war" (Hicks 1939, p. 33).  
More than anything else, the seemingly contradictory statements reveal Keynes’ insight 
into the constantly changing nature of inflation and public awareness. The insight had been 
evolving over the last two or three decades. During the First World War Keynes had been in 
the Treasury. Yet despite considerable price increases he claimed he had "never at that time 
heard our financial problem discussed along these lines" (Keynes 1940a, p. 70). In his "Tract 
on Monetary Reform" Keynes described the public as "generally (…) very slow to grasp the 
situation and embrace the remedy" (Keynes 1923, p. 40) when governments attempted to tax 
away their wealth through inflation. Initially they might even hoard money in the belief that 
prices will soon come down again. Yet already in the early 1920s, Keynes thought that there 
was a temporal limit to this. As soon as discovery set in, the public would begin to change its 
habits, either by turning to durable objects, by reducing the amount of money they kept, or by 
employing foreign money (Keynes 1923, p. 41). At this point Keynes described the continuous 
use of depreciated money by the public not so much as a problem of awareness but as a problem 
of convenience, and a lack of alternatives:  
"Like other conveniences of life the use of money is taxable, and, although for various 
reasons this particular form of taxation is highly inexpedient, a government can get 
resources by a continuous practice of inflation, even when this is foreseen by the public 
generally, unless the sums they seek to raise in this way are very grossly excessive" 
(Keynes 1923, p. 43). 
 
In the Times articles of November 1939 Keynes seems to have followed Hicks' 
impression of an increased awareness since World War I, and its institutional implications. 
Calling to mind the necessity of a time-lag between price increases and wage demands, Keynes 
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now argued that "there are today many wage rates linked by agreement with the cost of living, 
so that the two move together" (Keynes 1939a, p. 43). Keynes also stressed the same problem 
of an increasing inflation-awareness in a reply letter to a Mr. H. Barrow. Mr. Barrow, who 
himself favored inflation, had accused Keynes of being a deflationist. It was, Keynes stated, 
"perhaps, a comfort" that inflation was "always there (…) to fall back on". Yet given the 
necessary time-lag he also doubted whether "in modern conditions" this time-lag would be 
"long enough to do the trick". As everyone had become "index-number conscious" the result 
would be that wages would pursue prices "with not so lame a foot". Summing up his reply, 
Keynes stated: "And this new fact means that the old-type laissez-faire inflation is no longer to 
be relied upon." (Keynes 1940c, p. 120-121).  
Yet laborers had not been the only ones becoming more conscious. Already in an article 
one year earlier, Keynes had expressed his hope for lower inflation rates due to a heightened 
awareness on the part of public officials as well: "We have adopted price controls at the outset 
and are more conscious of the problem" (Keynes 1939e, p. 78). While the problem-
consciousness that Keynes was addressing here referred to the authorities in charge of economic 
policy, Keynes also assumed a deeper transformation of inflation awareness affecting the whole 
of society. Yet Keynes’ assessment about the current state of inflation awareness remained 
necessarily speculative because it was understood to be an empirical fact based on historical 
experiences rather than a timeless quality of rational economic actors. Nowhere does Keynes 
imply, however, a prevalence of widespread "money illusion" in times of inflation.  
 
Inflation and the National Debt 
 
Given the preoccupation of "How to Pay for the War" with the distribution of debt rather 
than with inflation per se, it is puzzling that the latter has attracted much more attention in the 
scholarly literature. When looking back to the inflation of World War I, Keynes concluded: 
"No one benefited except the profiteer. The seeds of much subsequent trouble were sown. And 
we ended up with a national debt vastly greater in terms of money than was necessary and very 
ill distributed through the community" (Keynes 1940a, p. 73). The large debt payments required 
a high level of taxation to pay the "rentiers". Economic historians later added that the high 
interest rates necessary to attract investors also crowded out private sector investments to the 
detriment of employment (Foreman-Peck 2002, p. 108). The young Keynes had been rather 
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unprepared for the possibility of financing a long war through inflation and massive borrowing. 
In 1914, as a 31-year-old, Keynes had argued that the war "would be short since governments 
would find it hard to appropriate the resources needed to support the war" (Maital 1972: 1583). 
"How to Pay for the War" was the result of having learned from historical experience and 
personal misjudgment. 
Already by the early 1920s Keynes had developed a much more informed understanding 
of the relations between public debt, monetary policy, and exchange rates. The level of internal 
debt figured as the crucial variable defining the scope of monetary policy, and thus the exchange 
rate. In a lecture to the Institute of Bankers, Keynes said:  
"You can always restore the currency to any value you like if you want to provided that 
it does not increase the claims of the bond-holders beyond what is tolerable. If it does, 
the Government is certain to be forced to inflate again, and the work will be undone" 
(Keynes 1922, p. 46). 
The lecture was what would become a typically Keynesian attack on the "inactive bond-
holding rentier class" to whose earnings there had always been a limit set by what the "active 
earning part of the community" was willing to endure. In particular, it offered a defense of the 
principle that contracts referred to nominal rather than real monetary values. Some of Keynes' 
contemporaries had questioned the "justice" of such contracts once the value of money 
deteriorated. Keynes was not willing to buy this argument on the line that he thought it was 
"utterly impossible to compel the active part of the community to hand over an undue proportion 
to the bondholding class." (ibid., p. 47). 
In his Tract on Monetary Reform, Keynes found "it would be too cynical to suppose 
that, in order to secure the advantages (of money depreciation, ST), governments (except, 
possibly, the Russian government) depreciate their currencies on purpose." (Keynes 1923, p. 
53, also see: White et al. 2009). Yet if there was an intolerable level of debt, countries would 
either repudiate the debt, impose a capital levy, or inflate away the debt as Austria and Germany 
had done. Keynes’ "great objection" to the third option was that it fell on small savings just as 
much as on big ones while possibly enriching "the ordinary entrepreneur capitalist". Since 
Keynes held the small savers to be too conservative to vote for a capital levy, and the 
entrepreneurs to be in favor of depreciation, he expected inflation to be the preferred choice of 
 
3 see: John Maynard Keynes, "War and the Financial System " and " The Prospects of Money," ECONOMIC 
JOURNAL (August and November 1914" ( 
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dealing with high levels of debt - even though it was "unjust, inequitable, disastrous" (Keynes 
1922, p. 49). 
Keynes' proposal of "How to Pay for the War" had been driven by the unequal burden 
of national debt resulting from Word War I which contrary to his expectations had not been 
inflated away. It is little surprising that his solution of deferred pay introduced a specific link 
the management of the public debt. It was not that Keynes opposed borrowing by the state in 
favor of taxation. He thought the idea that war expenditures should be met "out of increased 
current effort and diminished current consumption" via taxation to be neither "just" nor "wise". 
Compassionately he wrote that it would make "all the difference in the world to each individual 
personally whether the excess of his income over his consumption is taken from him by tax or 
by loan". A loan would mean an addition to "his wealth, to his security, and to his comfort in 
facing the future", something which taxation would not provide. (Keynes 1939a, p. 45). 
It is true that Keynes himself was much more concerned with the problem of wage 
adjustment than with debt devaluation. Mr. Barrow had in fact not called for inflation in order 
to expropriate labor but to lessen the debt burden. In his lengthy reply Keynes remained lofty 
in general terms and only touched briefly upon the specific issue of national debt. There was 
"much sentiment of this kind underground", Keynes acknowledged "too shy to lift its head for 
execution (…) And there is a flavour of naughtiness about it which some members of the Left 
find irresistible; there must be something good, they feel, in a proposal so repugnant to all 
respectable citizens". But while he admitted that "the reduction in the burden of the National 
Debt is a subsequent result of reducing the value of money" he did not see much value in it as 
it made "no significant contribution to the current financing of the war" (Keynes 1940c, p. 120-
121). Thus, Keynes treated the proposal primarily as a danger to his non-inflationary scheme. 
His reply gives no clear hint as to whether Keynes might also have favored an inflationary 
reduction of debt after the war. 
Interestingly, however, Keynes saw his plan rather as a burden to the Treasury, precisely 
because it tried to rule out inflation:  
"A system of deferment of pay—and equally, a system of highly successful voluntary 
savings—will leave us with a larger national debt, measured in terms of real value, than 
if we adopt the method of imperfectly successful voluntary savings supplemented by 
inflation. For inflation is a mighty tax-gatherer. But the Treasury and the tax-payer of 
the future need only remain in doubt if they expect the price level reached by inflation 
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to continue permanently. For the national debt under the inflationary system is likely to 
be larger in terms of money than under the system of compulsory savings; so that if 
prices subsequently fall back, the benefits of inflation will have proved illusory even to 
the Treasury" (Keynes 1940a, p. 68-69).  
Thus, "How to Pay for the War" was less inflationary in terms of policy prescription 
than what the War Finance Group, including economists like Berry, Durbin, Gaitskell and 
Piercy had advocated in their meetings. These economists who took over administrative duties 
during the war, saw inflation as having the advantage of reducing the real debt, and they argued 
in favor of it. It should be noted, however, that Gaitskell and others always envisioned a 
"moderate and controlled inflation" that was restricted to a wartime economy, and that they 
were themselves enthusiastic of Keynes’ non-inflationary ideas (Howson 1993, p. 75-76). This 
was also in line with Labour´s post-war full employment policy, the "central point" of which 
was "the maintenance of aggregate demand to prevent both inflation and deflation" (Howson 
1993, p. 92). This highlights the contemporary view of seeing monetary fluctuations as largely 
resulting from private investment rather than monetary policy. Like Keynes, his economist 
colleagues were prepared to use controls against the immediate postwar inflation, and seemed 
utterly unprepared for continuous inflation beyond the envisioned post-war slump thereafter.  
 
"How to Pay for the War" in Context: State Finance, Interest Rates and Inflation during 
and after WWII 
 
After Keynes had published "How to Pay for the War" he became frustrated. The general 
impression he got was that the public seemed to not take the financial problem of the war 
seriously. In terms of public financing, his ideas of "How to Pay for the War" became half-
heartedly implemented at best (Toye 1999). Meanwhile, however, the Treasury was involved 
in the practical necessities of public financing. In this context of thinking about the possibilities 
of managing interest rates, Keynes played a more crucial role (Skidelsky III, p. 26; cf. 
Moggridge 2002, p. 114). Sayers has credited Keynes for being a decisive factor in the patient 
interest policy of the Treasury. Keynes and other economists were not only decisive in 
explaining the advantages of low interest rates - of which the officials were readily aware (Allen 
2019, 30). They were more generally important "in their illumination of the fundamental causes 
of war inflation" (Sayers 1956, p. 204). 
17 
 
Low interest rates became a predominant theme for financing the war for which Keynes 
made a number of practical suggestions. The high interest rates that the Treasury had had to 
pay during the First Word War clearly acted like a trauma. Pointing out how much the Treasury 
could save simply by borrowing at half a percentage point less was one of Keynes’ first 
publicity stunts shortly after the war had begun. His "Sibylline books" principle put pressure on 
the public to invest in gilts as each new issue would have a longer maturity and was thus 
considered less attractive (Allen 2019, p. 48).  
It seems safe to say that Keynes, despite his contempt for rentier incomes, did not 
envision an inflationary post-war era of "financial repression". Although he provided important 
advice in managing long-term interest rates, he never expected Treasury officials to be able to 
actually "cheat" the public over longer periods of time through a steady dosage of inflation. 
While Keynes war in favor of capital controls it is doubtful whether he would have appreciated 
them as an institutional backing for expropriating savers through inflation. Even more radical 
policy advisors like James Meade adhered to the principle of low inflation. Disagreeing with 
Keynes on the "proper rewards" of private savings, Meade stated:  
"The more I examine the problem, the more certain it seems to me that the proper radical 
solution is to get interest rates down to or towards zero, thereby killing two birds with 
one stone: avoiding economic stagnation and removing the burden of debt interest on 
the budget. The only argument against this would be if it led to inflation; but within 
reason such a development could be counteracted by running a budgetary surplus" 
(Cabinet Office Diary, p. 46; cf. Howson 1993, p. 50).  
 
The years after the Second World War did not witness a continuing fall in interest rates 
but rather fluctuations. Howson argues that Dalton´s policy of lowering nominal interest rates 
was initially successful because of its unanticipated inflationary consequences, but this policy 
could not be sustained as expectations adapted (Howson 1993, p. 181). What remained in terms 
of experience from World War I was not the beneficial effects of inflation – much the contrary 
– but the need for extending controls beyond the immediate needs of the war time economy 
(Howson and Moggridge, p. 231).  
The analysis thus supports the established view in English historiography that financial 
policy after the war should be seen as a continuation of "cheap money" and a policy out of 
necessity rather than a grand scheme of expropriating bond holders. As such it was 
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discontinuous and highly context-dependent, rather than the beginning of a long era of 
"financial repression". It is no coincidence that the periodization is different and much more 
detailed in the studies of British postwar finance relative to studies on "financial repression". 
This echoes skeptical comments by Schnabel (2015) and Allen (2014 and 2019) on the validity 
of "financial repression" as a distinguishable "era". If neither real interest rates nor policy 





Should Keynes’ writings during the Second World War, in particular his "How to Pay 
for the War" be seen as a policy guide for "financial repression"? A close reading of the sources 
provides little support for the current status of "How to Pay for the War" as a sort of founding 
document for an "era of financial repression". What can be confirmed is that "How to Pay for 
the War" highlighted the necessity of control and state intervention in order to cope with the 
financial burdens of the war economy. As such it was dealing with a particular situation 
(Trevithick 1975). Keynes’ statements provide general insights with regards to important 
macroeconomic implications of shifts in supply and demand, but few general insights in terms 
of long-term policy recommendations. There is, however, a visibly dismissive attitude towards 
the "rentier" which by the 1940s had a long tradition, reflecting not only Keynes’ attitude but 
the historical experiences of the English public since World War I. These attitudes clearly 
provide an important background to attempts of controlling the interest rates of public bonds.  
With regards to the problem of inflation awareness, "money illusion", and the use of 
inflation as a policy tool "How to Pay for the War" provided no guidance. Keynes neither 
believed – in line with Leijinhufvud (1981) - in "money illusion", nor in inflation. To the 
contrary, the whole document was a warning against the use of inflation for financing 
requirements of the state. On the one hand, inflation is presented as distributively unjust, turning 
against small savers and putting more money than necessary in the hands of the "profiteers". 
On the other hand, it might have proven to be unreliable in a world in which the "old laws" of 
laissez-faire seemed no longer to be working. While the first reflected a lack of alternatives 
rather than public awareness, the second hinted at the evolutionary nature of inflation in a 
changing social context. Because of this neither inflation nor inflation awareness could be 
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modelled in a general sense. This could explain why it has proved so hard to pin down Keynes’ 
views on the concept of "money illusion" (Chytilova 2017).  
While the analysis confirms the attempts by O'Connell (2016) and earlier writers 
(Moggridge and Howson 1974; Trevithick 1975; Leeson 1996) to rescue Keynes from charges 
of being an "inflationist" there is also an important and more general implication from this. 
Economists have treated the transition from "Keynesianism" to "Monetarism" as homo 
oeconomicus' liberation from the irrationality of "money illusion". This had far reaching 
implications for economic theorizing, for monetary and fiscal policy, as well as for labor market 
regulations. It also underpinned the transition to "financial liberalization" (McKinnon 1973). 
The interpretation is legitimate in so far as "Keynesian" economists like Duesenberry (1950) 
did indeed interpret Keynes’ writings, the "General Theory" and "How to Pay for the War" in 
particular, as containing the assumption of stable "money illusion" (Trevithick 1975). Putting 
Keynes himself into perspective shows that little is gained by trying to bring "money illusion" 
back into economic modeling without paying attention to the complexity of changing social 
settings. This echoes Charles Kindleberger´s skepticism of interpreting inflation by adhering to 
technical economic theories at the expense of "the socio-economic matrix in which the 
economic events take place" (Kindleberger 1984, p. 31).  
Finally, the analysis provides little support for the idea of an "era of financial repression" 
that has become an important label for periodizing the post-war world from a financial 
perspective. The low real interest rates during and immediately after the war were a direct effect 
of having learned about the difficult transition of moving from a war economy to a post-war-
worlds, and in particular the burden that high public debt levels could place on the state. The 
high bank rates that had been imposed in England after the First World War in order to deal 
with inflationary pressures had proved disastrous. Keynes policy prescriptions were thus 
inherently anti-inflationary to avoid such problems in the first place. There is little to no 
evidence that Treasury or the Bank of England had an interest in inflation as a "mighty tax 
gatherer". This does not mean that there is no ground for distinguishing the period from the end 
of the Second World War to the mid-1970s. Yet "financial repression" might not be the most 
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